The Arrow of Fire
Immediately following the Torah portion of the ten commandments, we read the portion of Mishpatim which discusses the laws of monetary obligation.
Among the many laws are the laws of torts, the obligation to pay for damage that one has caused. The Torah classifies four general categories of damages, they are: the ”ox that gored”, a “pit”, “an animal that ate produce”[1] and “fire”. These categories are analyzed and explained at great length in the Talmud.
In this week’s portion the Torah states:
If a fire goes forth and finds thorns, and a stack of grain or standing grain or the field be consumed, the one who ignited the fire shall surely pay.[2]
Of all the forms of damages, damage by fire is, in some ways, the most intriguing. Fire is distinct from all other forms of damage and does not fit neatly into the usual theory of liability. There is, therefore, a disagreement between two Talmudic sages, Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, as to the underlying reason, or doctrine, under which the “owner” of the fire is held responsible:
Rabbi Yochanan says “fire is like his arrow”, while Reish Lakish says “fire is like his property”.[3]
According to Rabbi Yochanan, when a person’s fire causes damage, it is very different from a scenario in which a person’s animal causes damage. An animal is a tangible possession of value and as such the person is responsible for damage caused by his possessions. Fire, by contrast, is intangible, and therefore cannot be considered as a possession which has caused damage. Rabbi Yochanan, therefore, believes that the obligation to pay for damage caused by fire is based on the doctrine that “fire is like an arrow”.
Rabbi Yochanan’s logic is as follows: when a person throws an arrow which causes damage, the person is held responsible on the basis of the theory that although he did not actually cause the damage with his own hands, the arrow is considered an extension of himself, and thus he is responsible just as if he himself had caused the damage. Similarly, argues Rabbi Yochanan, in the case of fire, although the person did not cause the damage with his own hands, lighting the fire and not protecting it is comparable to throwing an arrow. We therefore consider the damage done by the fire to be equivalent to the damage done by the owner’s own hands.
Reish Lakish disagrees.
Reish Lakish argues that lighting fire cannot be compared to throwing an arrow. While the arrow flies only because the person throws it, fire, by contrast, travels on its own. Fire travels through burning the fuel it finds in its path. Fire, argues Reish Lakish, is very different from an arrow.
Rejecting the arrow doctrine, Reish Lakish believes that “fire is like his property”. Despite the differences between fire and conventional property, whereas conventional property is tangible while fire is not, Reish Lakish maintains that the owner of the fire is responsible for the damage caused by the fire, because the fire is considered to be his property.
Based on this Talmudic discussion, the post Talmudic codifiers rule that indeed “fire is like an arrow”.[4]
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Law is more than a utilitarian system that allows for a functioning society. The law is an expression and a reflection of the values, attitudes and morals of a culture. Indeed, reading the Talmudic debate, studying and internalizing that indeed “fire is like his arrow” can have a profound impact on our spiritual well being.
Almost all “damage” that a person brings upon himself stems from the separation in his mind between an act that causes pleasure at the moment and the negative consequences which result in the future. Almost all good and valuable achievements come from investing time and effort which subsequently produce a benefit in the future. In other words, “damage” is the separation of the act from its final result, while “goodness” results from envisioning in the present effort the reward that will come in the future.
The most important ingredient for success in life, then, is the ability to see the end result of a given action as a direct extension of the action.
For, indeed, “his fire is like his arrow”.
[1] Others interpret the third category as referring to damage caused by a person himself.
[2] Exodus 22:5.
[3] Talmud, Baba Kama 22a.
[4] There is a practical ramification to the debate. If the liability is based on the doctrine of “fire is like his arrow”, then, in a case that the fire damaged a person, the owner of the fire would have to pay not only for damages but also for the pain, medical expenses, lost labor and shame, which are required only in a case where a person himself, not his possession, damaged. If, however, the liability of fire is based on the doctrine that “fire is like his property”, then, in a case where the fire damaged a person, the owner would only be liable to pay for the damages alone, and not the additional four categories. See Talmud Baba Kama 23a.